NATO and Salami Tactics

Since NATO is a defence pact of several nations against aggression, its core policy is deterrence. Deterrence aims to prevent a potentially dangerous party by using threats and/or limited force. Therefore, deterrence can only be used if there are at least two parties that fear each other. If a threatened organisation cannot create fear on the threatening party, deterrence cannot be provided. That is, a policy cannot prevent an attack if a party believes that a particular countermeasure won’t be used at a particular threat level.

Izzet Enunlu,

 Strategies of the Cold War

When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, initial assessment of the signatory countries  was that they were numerically weaker than Soviet forces. To compensate for this weakness, the deterrent force used against the Soviet Union was the threat of retaliation with American nuclear weapons. This strategy, deterrence by punishment, was supported by a second strategy, deterrence through denial. The second strategy aimed to position adequate conventional force on the  borders of NATO to deny the benefits of a quick invasion.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union developed a conceptually and strategically less defined strategy that is called Salami Slicing Tactics. This tactic aims several small gains without inciting a major retaliation from the opponent. At the end of the process cumulative additions obtained are expected to equal to the gain that would be obtained by a single major conflict.

An example of the slicing tactic during the cold war was the communist takeover of the Eastern European Countries and the formation of the Eastern Bloc. By the end of WWII, Eastern Europe was under the control of the Soviet Union and this advantage was used to insure the election of communist governments in several countries. As a result, from 1945 to 1949 without a major incident Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, and East Germany fell under the control of the Soviets.

As the Soviets built their nuclear arsenal and both sides developed their ability to deliver nuclear weapons into the interior of the opposing country the concept of mutually assured destruction emerged.

NATO decided to enforce its conventional shield forces and position them as close as possible to the Soviet border to pin an attack and deny the freedom of action to Soviet forces keeping the engagement not to escalate to a nuclear conflict. The idea to include Sweden and Finland to NATO to get close to Russia emerged by the early years of the cold war.

 Optimism of the West, Slices of President Putin and Brain Dead Years of NATO

With the ending of the cold war NATO lost its main villain, the Soviet Union. In the absence of a major rival NATO’s existence had the danger of being redundant. Even the relations between the NATO alliance and Russia began to improve thanks to several agreements on cooperation. Small-scale operations by intervening to Bosnian and Kosovo wars and the activation of the 5th article to defend a member state for the first time in its history by the USA in Afghanistan did not improve its importance to the level during the cold war. Even its status had begun to be described as brain dead.

The Optimistic and wishful West was ready to forget the Cold War but autocracies tend to last long and result in a geriatric leadership that remembers the old ways. President Putin, being an intelligence officer of the cold war era, was well versed with the salami tactics of the Soviets and began slicing territories close to the Russian border. The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was the first slice as the region was considered inside the borders of Russia by the west and also evaluated potentially to become a fundamentalist Islamic failed state. However the reincorporation of the region to the new Russian Empire opened the door for further slices.

 NATO and the Black Sea Region

For NATO the central Europe and the north where the majority of major NATO states located were more vulnerable because of the geographic proximity to Russia. Moreover Russia kept a strong naval presence on the North with its Fleet and the ballistic nuclear missile submarines.

In the South the access to the Black Sea is limited by the Montreux convention for the non-Black Sea nations. Moreover, except the strong military of Turkey, the Balkan members are new additions to the pact and they have poor infrastructure, and smaller military. However the Black Sea fleet of Russia was far less stronger than its Northern and before 2014 Russian land forces were farther from the region. As a result it was reasoned that a Russian aggression to NATO had to through attacking Turkey activating NATO by the 5th article.

By cutting out South Ossetia from Georgia, occupying the Donbas region and annexing Crimea from Ukraine Russia could gradually approach the West from the South imposing an increasing threat and also proving that NATO was defenceless against the Slicing tactics.

 The Importance of the Loss of Crimean Peninsula to Russia

With the annexation of Crimea, one of the best ports of Black Sea, the Aqyar (so-called Sevastopol) port came under the full control of Russia. The ability of the Russian Fleet to impose its power in and around the Black Sea became much stronger due to its central location and well developed infrastructure of the port. The peninsula also acts like an aircraft carrier enabling air assaults by missile and military aircraft making the Black Sea a Russian sea.

The insensitivity of the West to the slicing tactics enabled first a foothold for Russian forces on the South of Ukraine to exert its pressure further into the Black Sea. Now their strong presence is established by the formation of a land corridor from Donbas region through the occupied territory in Kherson to Crimea.

If for the sake of a quick peace Crimea and occupied territories of Ukraine were to be sacrifices that would be the largest slice ever given to the sly tactics of Mr. Putin

 A New Cold War?

Fortunately, while many European countries who are far from the neighbourhood of Russia feel safe, the sensitivity of the new members from the Eastern Europe who still have fresh memories of Russian imperialism seems to still have an effect.

The West should keep in mind that the first slice of Mr. Putin was much farther and the last one is on the border of the European Union. If this last aggression would benefit Russia with territorial gains, new and more daring possibilities could occur to Russia. Would a member of NATO be small enough to be sacrificed as a slice? Would the West dare to use its nuclear deterrence as a last resort if one of its members, however small, is violated?

NATO seems to awaken from its slumber and at the moment, encouraged by the poor performance of the Russian army, and to refrain Russia from a reckless attack decides to strengthen its Shield and to enlarge its Umbrella inviting Sweden and Finland as members. If these steps help, we might survive to call the new era the Second Cold War. However, it seems that we will remember the period between the two cold wars with Russia's salami tactics and the West's failure to prevent these tactics.