Answers to popular questions from Tom Cooper

How many Patriots does the Ukrainian Armed Forces need? How will F-16s affect combat operations? What are the threats of the Russian Armed Forces' glider bombs? And other open questions from the Austrian analyst

photo: NV

1.)    I find it hard to believe that for the past 40 years, the USSR/Russia has had the ability to snipe US planes from long-range, with the US air force being unable to retaliate, and the Pentagon was somehow chill about it and didn’t bother developing a countermeasure.

This is complex to answer, because of numerous relevant factors.

In German, we tend to say something like that ‘fish stinks starting from its head’. It’s similar in the US armed forces. In the USA, this story is starting in the White House, Capitol, and the Pentagon…but, for the reasons of simplicity, I’ll start with the Pentagon.

Just like specific US politicians think it’s better for the defence of the USA if certain weapons systems are manufactured in ‘their’ federal states, while better weapons systems manufactured in other federal states ‘must’ be cancelled…. In the US armed forces there is a lots of… ‘predilection to think in terms of dogmas’. See, ‘troops’ (whether soldiers in the army, marines, or pilots in air force or navy or marine corps, or sailors on warships) are ‘trained to think a specific way and that’s it’. Everybody is supposed to follow prescribed checklists, and think and fight in the same way. Of course, there are more than enough officers clever enough to think ‘outside the box’, but such ‘activities’ are frequently discouraged, if not outright curbed (at least until the officers in question prove to be right, which, usually, happens much too late, and ends with the end of careers of the officers in question). As a result – and generally – the influence of officers in question remains very limited.

(somewhat ironically, my experience is that most of such officers can be found exactly in the one branch of the US armed forces usually ‘damned’ by Hollywood-movies as ‘dumb religious fanatics’; see, the US Marine Corps)

Several of resulting ‘dogmas’ became something like ‘famous’ over the time. For example, the Hughes AIM-54 Phoenix long-range air-to-air missile is always said to have been ‘designed and developed to kill Russian bombers (only)’ and thus until this very day the mass of people think it couldn’t do anything else. This went so far that the same way of thinking was projected upon the only aircraft ever equipped with the AIM-54: Grumman F-14 Tomcat. See, ‘good to kill Russian bombers only’.

(….to digress a bit now… ‘Unsurprisingly’, one of related dogmas was that ‘Iranians can’t operate their F-14s and thus used them as mini-AWACS only’ [you’re going to hear this until this very day, especially from veteran US Navy F-14-crews]. Now, I happen to be the weirdo that came to the undogmatic idea of ‘researching Iranian F-14-operations during the war with Iraq in different fashion’ [see: with help of unofficial channels] – and, between others – some 25 years ago managed to point out that all such dogmas are wrong, because Iranian F-14s were regularly scoring kills against ‘manoeuvrable Iraqi fighter jets’. Don’t worry: it only earned me the reputation of being ‘controversial’… because, you know, somebody there who has done 0 research about this topic, but has a social media account of 2010-2020s, knows so much better what it was to research about this topic before there was the internet… at least it was [regularly] funny to meet veteran US Navy F-14-crews and then hear questions like,  ‘oh… did they, actually?’)

Less-well-known, yet related dogmas within the US Navy were such like, ‘F-14s have to stick with aircraft they are tasked with protecting, not to mess around with suddenly appearing enemy interceptors, no matter what’s going on’… has cost the US Navy a few near-certain kills over Iraq, in 1991… (and few F-14-pilots their careers, too).

This way of thinking is then projected upon the opponent. See: ‘yes, the Russians had MiG-31s and their R-33s (100km effective range) already back in the early 1980s, but these were meant to (read: can) kill bombers and cruise missiles over Siberia, only’.

So, if the US Navy was as dogmatic about a weapons system (F-14 jet + AWG-9 radar + AIM-54 missile) for which it has spent literal billions, and which was some 40 years ahead of its time (at the time it entered service, back in the early 1970s)…. Then… well, why should then the US Air Force – the US Navy’s fiercest rival (if not its biggest enemy!) – come to the idea that the F-14 (and its AIM-54s) might be a better idea than its own, ‘golden’ F-15?

Or that the Soviets/Russians might deploy their MiG-31s to go killing USAF’s F-15s over the Central Europe?

Aw, come on! ‘Everybody knew’ that this would neeeeever happen.

Correspondingly, the USAF took another decade to develop the AIM-120 and meanwhile flatly refused to buy F-14s even when facing such a challenge like defending the continental USA, back in the 1970s.

I’m now going to ‘slaughter a few sacred cows’, but let me add that it’s not that much different in Europe. Take the British as example: they were so super-clever, they’ve spent all of the 1970s and 1980s spending for research and development of their Tornado F.Mk.2/F.Mk.3 interceptor, which, once finally brought to something like ‘what we originally wanted to have’-standard, in the 1990s, still ended being inferior to the F-14 from the 1970s.

At most (though predictably), the USAF ‘solved’ this problem by developing ultra-expensive (and late) F-22 ‘stealth interceptor’ – which was then armed in similar fashion like F-15 was, around the time it entered service (back in the late 1970s): with much too short-ranged air-to-air missiles (AAMs): see AIM-7Fs and AIM-9Ls.

Then came the 1990s, and the Cold War was over, and everybody was disarming (yes, so also the USA), and then the West spent two decades with squandering trillions for fighting ‘police actions’ all over the world. Meanwhile, Dick Chenney killed the F-14 project, leaving the US Navy without option but to replace its F-14s with (much too short-ranged, too slow, and too small for the task) F/A-18 Hornets. While the US Air Force and its ‘F-15s, ah-so-very-much victorious against Iraq in 1991 and Serbia in 1999’ was so super-über-drüber-turbo, that… well, why waste yet more money for F-22s, when F-15 is so good and there is no threat in sight, eh?

Besides, Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, the Pentagon etc. all knew better (especially about how to squander more of taxpayer’s money) and then rolled out the JSF-contest, resulting in the F-35… which is stealthy, yes, but much too slow for the task of an interceptor, which is why then the USAF ‘still’ has to keep its F-22s in service, although these are meanwhile obsolete and incompatible with the rest of the force.

And so it went on. Also when the Russians then came up with the R-37M and then began installing it on their Su-35S’, too, back in around 2020… well, that was ‘nice to see… anyway, back to watching that football match on TV’.

Actually, it was only the fact the Chinese began working on weapons like PL-11, and then (and especially) the PL-15 that prompted at least some in the Pentagon to think differently, and consider ordering a development of an ‘extended range AIM-120’: the AIM-120D. This has an advertised max range of 160km, has entered service in 2019, but was so far sold only to few ‘special’ NATO-members (AFAIK, Australia, Canada, Norway, and UK): i.e. largely, it is something like ‘remains reserved for US forces only’. And is still (woefully) too short ranged in comparison to the R-37M.

Don’t worry, though: AMRAAM-ER and AIM-260 and whatever else are ‘undergoing development’, of course… as if this would mean any is already in service, and especially so in Ukraine of these days!?

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2.)    Is there any proof that Russia is using R-37Ms?

Yes, there is. Few days ago, saw even a video of a MiG-31 firing one at an Ukrainian jet (and, apparently, killing it, too). Another example was the video of an Ukrainian MiG-29 shot down (after releasing its JDAMs or HAMMERs over the frontline) earlier this month.

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3.)    In your opinion, how many Patriot batteries does Ukraine need to reduce VKS activity along the frontlines (only front, not to protect cities)?

In such cases, I’m always starting with cities because if one can’t protect them, it’s likely to become futile to protect the frontline – and the other way around. Correspondingly, and ‘in a perfect world’:

-          There are some 22 major urban areas in Ukraine: each would require one MIM-104 battery;

-          The frontline would require another 10-12.

That said, this would not be enough, because MIM-104 is good for certain tasks, and less so for others. Thus, an even better solution would be a mix of some 50-60 batteries of MIM-104s, IRIS-T, NASAMs and similar weapons.

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4.)    Would a Gripen-Meteor combination be more helpful than F-16-AIM-120?

Provided the Meteor air-to-air missile proves as effective in combat as it proved during testing (and mind: the mass of what it has proven to be able to do, during testing, was never published), yes, no doubt about that.

We do have to hope that Stockholm and Kyiv might conclude their related negotiations, ‘asap’, and get the things to Ukraine, pronto.

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5.)    Is it better to start deploying F-16s in combat as soon as they are in Ukraine or keep them back until the total number of available aircraft, pilots, and ground personnel is higher?

Very good question! AFAIK, there are something like ‘two schools of thought’ about this issue. One is to strike as soon as possible with whatever is available. The other is to keep any new weapons system back until this is available in such numbers that it ‘matters’ (i.e. can cause serious damage to the enemy).

This is where I think that what matters…or is going to matter in Ukraine – is the nature of its government, i.e. the way Zelensky is ‘fighting this war’ (which is what I’ve described in the recent feature ‘Showmasters & Adventurers’). He ‘needs PR-points’ and is ‘commanding’ correspondingly, and thus I think we have to expect him to order the PSU’s F-16s into combat as soon as ‘at least two’ are available. Both to bolster the morale at home, and to attract yet more support from the West. We’ve seen him acting in similar fashion already several times, see:

-          deployment of anti-ship missiles to sink the guided missile cruiser Moskva;

-          deployment of naval drones to target single warships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet;

-          deployment of UAVs to strike oil refineries in Russia.

In each of these cases there was no ‘hold back’: new weapons were deployed as soon as available. The results were ‘flashy’, no doubt. But, consider this:

-          why not waiting until a higher number of anti-ship missiles was available, and then simultaneously strike (and sink) several Russian warships, instead of ‘just’ one guided missile cruiser? Think about PR-effects in such case…

-          Why not waiting until a larger number of naval drones was available to try doing the same (i.e. hit several Russian warships at once)?

-          Why not waiting until there are enough UAVs with a range of 1000km to deploy them, en masse, against the Russian oil refineries – and then ‘hit 10 refineries at once’, instead of one by one?

Military-wise, in each case, the ‘waiting until there are numbers’ would have been much more opportune. The moment of surprise and the resulting shock on the Russian side would have been much higher. And it’s harder to repair ’10 refineries at once’, than do so one by one, over months….Moreover, the Russians would not have been given months (and, meanwhile: years) to adapt to the new threat.

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6.)    (Except for F-16), the Swedish-made JAS.39 is also an option. How would one squadron influence the situation on at least one sector of the frontline?

Generally, what’s valid for F-16s is valid for JAS.39s. See: as long as there are not some 20-30 of them around in Ukraine, not much is going to change. In this case, the reader tried to make things easier by asking what would change if Ukrainian air force would have enough JAS.39s to, for example, cover ‘just’ one sector of the frontline.

Answering this requires additional ‘definitions’. For example: the number of jets available. General rule is that

a)       Air forces are usually organised into squadrons of 12, 16, or 20 aircraft;

b)      This is also how they are procuring aircraft (i.e. in batches of 12, 16 or 20); and,

c)       in protracted wars like this one, and simultaneously, something like one third of available aircraft can be constantly kept on alert or fly combat sorties; one third is meanwhile used for training, and one third undergoing maintenance (or similar activities).

Correspondingly, and for example, out of 12 jets (no matter what type), on average one has to expect to have 4 on hand (or, in the case of 16, some 5-6; and, in the case of 20, some 9-10).

Now, for this example and in the case of a squadron of 12 aircraft: one could expect two of these to be tasked with air-to-air and two with ground attacks.

What would they change? If armed with Meteors (like JAS.39s are) – and in theory – two air-to-air armed examples could be scrambled to intercept any of incoming Russian air strikes. I.e. they would be deployed to try preventing Russian Su-34s from releasing their UMPKs (which, tanks to the range of Meteor air-to-air missiles, should be possible to do from longer ranges than with AIM-120C-7s). The two armed for air-to-ground could then strike selected targets with weapons like JDAM.

Of course, in the case of emergency or similar, the unit in question would be required to add additional aircraft to the operations. It is rare that all of these would be fully mission capable: usual rates are somewhere at between 80 and 90%. Thus, a unit of 12 aircraft should be expected to have 9-11 aircraft fully mission capable at any point in time.

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7.)    USA should deliver (Republic) A-10A Thunderbolt II close-air-support jets to Ukraine: they would be better than

Yes, lots of people are fascinated by the A-10 Thunderbolt II – for example because of its big and powerful gun calibre 30mm. And this opinion seems to be highly popular in the social media, too. However….

In an air war as dominated by air defence weapons as this one, A-10s wouldn’t perform better than available Su-25s. On the contrary. Crucial for effectiveness of attack aircraft in this war are survivability and precision. Survivability is primarily provided though speed (see: ‘speed is life’). A-10 might have better armour than Su-25, and be more manoeuvrable, but it’s also much slower. Being slower means that, once inside the combat zone, the A-10 offers the opponent more time to detect it, and more time to deploy countermeasures (i.e. more time to fight and target it by different weapons).

As next, deploying that ‘sexy’ 30mm gun… well, not only that Su-25 also has a 30mm gun, but: deploying that gun requires the A-10 to fly straight and level. One can’t aim guns, nor hit anything, if not flying straight and level. Flying straight and level is making the job of enemy air defence gunners a lot easier, though.

With other words: under the current circumstances in Ukraine, the A-10 would be (even) less useful than already available Su-25s. What Ukraine needs in terms of combat aircraft are two things:

-          An interceptor capable of accelerating to more than 1,000km/h (or faster) while underway at altitudes below 100m, and equipped with an AAM with an _effective_ range of more than 200km; and

-          A fighter-bomber capable of hauling at least 1,000kg (better 3000kg) of ordnance while underway at altitudes below 100m, and having an effective range of at least 600km.

Sorry, but A-10 is nothing of that.

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8.)    Once Ukrainians get their F-16s, do you think they might start doing similar and using glide bombs to hit the Russians?

They are already doing that. See: deployment of JDAMs and (more recently) French-made HAMMERs from their MiG-29s.

Problem is that there are too few of both: MiG-29s modified to deploy JDAMs and/or HAMMERs, and JDAMs and HAMMERs.

Indeed, gauging by the proven short-sightedness of Western politicians and military strategists (see: failure to deliver ‘400+ main battle tanks in 2023’, and then ‘failure to provide not only artillery ammunition, but also ammunition for 100+ tanks they have delivered, plus spares and maintenance’), that’s going to remain that way even once Ukraine does get F-16s.

The way things are right now – and considering such like Macro are more preoccupied with boasting around with ‘increasing’ the shell production to ‘3,000 a month’ (wow! Must be these are really made by Cartier!), we can give the PSU some six months before jets end being grounded for the lack of spares, maintenance, and ammunition.

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9.)    Why don’t the USA/NATO/West organise something like ‘Flying Tigers’ squadron of veteran F-16-pilots, equip these with F-16s and send them to Ukraine?

Because people like Jake Sullivan (National Security Advisor to US Pres Biden), think it would be too aggressive vis-à-vis Pudding and his Russia to do what Pudding and his Russia are doing all the time already: see, hiring foreign mercenaries to go fighting in Ukraine.

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10.) Why don’t the Russians shoot down some of Ukrainian Su-24s attacking Crimea with their long-range air-to-air missiles?

Oh, they did (shot down a few of Ukrainian Su-24s involved in such operations). It just happens that

a)       Ukrainians are not particularly keen to ‘brag’ about such losses;

b)      the Keystone Cops in Moscow are too incompetent in their PR-warfare in this regards and thus never clearly pointing out such kills, nor providing clear evidence for them;

c)       the Western media is ignoring all the related Russian reporting, and

d)      meanwhile such occasions are extremely rare because the PSU has refined its tactics, plus it is using UAVs and other kind of decoys to confuse and distract the Russian air defences.

Finally: mind the Ukrainian ‘great A-50-hunt’ of the last December and this January: the primary purpose of the same was exactly to enable Su-24 to approach closely enough (and from desired directions, too) to launch their Storm Shadows or SCALP-EGs, without the Russian interceptors being capable of intercepting them before they can do so.

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11.) Why don’t the Russians attack Dnipro bridges?

No idea. Actually, I’m expecting them to do so since the morning of 23 February 2022. The reason is – at least to me – ‘more than logical’: knocking out Dnipro Bridges would make the job of keeping ZSU units deployed east of the Dnipro River massively more problematic. After all, one should never forget that the mass of supplies for these is transported by the Ukrainian railway system. So, knock out the bridges and the railways are out of use – which in turn would mean: the mass of ZSU troops east of Dnipro has a major supply problem.

But, they have not done that (yet). So, if I’m to guess, I think that early on, while they still had a lots of missiles on hand, the Russians didn’t care about this issue because there were other, ‘more important/more urgent’ targets. Meanwhile, the most likely reason is a mix of

a)       lack of suitable weapons (i.e. the decreased number of available ballistic- and cruise missiles), and

b)      lack of precision of available weapons.

Sure, the recent strike on the Dnipro HPP appears to be saying something else: that they have enough weapons with enough precision for such an attack. And, indeed, they’ve oversaturated local air defences by striking each of two blocks of that HPP by several different weapons (i.e. they didn’t target each with just one ballistic- or cruise missile, but each was targeted by several ballistic- and several cruise missiles: we’ve only got to see one of cruise missiles on a video). Point is: hitting a big concrete building is a significantly different affair than hitting a bridge, just like knocking out a power plant is (at least ‘slightly’) easier than knocking out a bridge. Should there be any doubts, remember all the Ukrainian efforts to knock out the Antonovsky Bridge over the Dnipro, back in September-October 2022.

Conclusion is on hand that the Keystone Cops in Moscow consider it more useful (for their purposes) to strike power plants in Ukraine, rather than bridges on the Dnipro.

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12.) Have I missed your comments on UMPB or are they coming in the future?

Think that yes, you did. At least I recall to have commented about them several times. The last time about a week ago (see: Few Thoughts on the Russian Reconnaissance-Strike Chain). Before that, back in December (see: FABs, KABs, or MPK/UMPKs, Part 2) and then earlier, too, plus, see the ‘It’s the Range, Stupid-series of features: the UMPKs are the essence of the issue on hand.  

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So hope, I didn’t miss too much i.e. I’m sure I did miss some more questions: sorry for that. Hope, I can catch with your other questions at some other opportunity.

The content is published with the permission of the author. First published here.