Review of why and what has Iran targeted and hit or not in Israel, what lead to that, what was used, and what can be expected
Firstly, the backgrounds. Indeed: the doctrine.
What am I talking about?
The doctrine (and especially: military doctrine) is outlining how are political decisions converted into military deeds: how should military means be used and how are military forces supposed to contribute through their operations.
With other words: if you know somebody’s doctrine, you know what to expect from that opponent in what case.
In the West – and then regardless if in the public, at the level of the mainstream media, at the ‘OSINT’-level, at the level of military intelligence, or the level of top political decision-makers – we have golden traditions of completely ignoring what the ‘other side’ says in this regards.
Which is why I’m one of few weirdos paying special attention about this issue.
A good example in this regards would be Iran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s ‘Nuclear Fatwa’. First issued verbally already back in the mid-1990s, it was something like ‘officially formulated’ (in written format) sometimes back in 2003, and then cited in an official Iranian statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), few years later. In the West, it is considered in all the possible ways, usually ranging somewhere between ‘lies’, ‘irrelevant’, and ‘why trust of pay attention?’. The few exceptions that do care about it are interpreting it with, ‘it prohibits the production and use of any form of weapons of mass destruction’.
The way I understand it is a ‘lil bit different’. I understand it as: ‘Iran shall not have assembled and ready-to-use weapons of mass destruction’. Shouldn’t mean it does not have all the pieces necessary to make them, though. With other words: everything necessary is there, just not assembled. The rest is ambiguous.
…but then: hey, please, don’t tell me that with ‘ambiguity’ and ‘nuclear weapons in the Middle East’ (or, for rearmost rows: Israel’s nuclear Ambiguity) is something new for you. Well, if it (still) is: then you’re really ‘late to this show’…
But, that’s just an example, and I’m starting to digress. The point in the case of this latest escalation between Iran, Israel, and the USA, was the following.
- 1.) Few weeks ago, and in the aftermath of an Israeli air strike on Syria in which at least two IRGC military advisors were killed in that country, the Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian said (essentially), ‘any attack on Iran/ian forces in Syria is going to be met with a strong response’.
With other words: in the light of repeated Israeli air strikes on its bases in Syria, the IRGC – and thus Tehran (because, and as explained here: no matter who is officially in charge in Tehran, it’s the IRGC that has the final word) – has adapted its doctrine. And Amir-Abdollahian was even so kind to announce this in the public. It’s just so that nobody listened. With the consequence that, according to Haaretz, even Netanyahu’s regime concluded its strike of 1 April in which the CO IRGC-QF in Syria, General Zahedi, and two other top IRGC officers were killed, was ‘foolish’. I.e. a strategic mistake. Or miscalculation. Or call it whatever you like.
Now for the next step:
- 2.) In the aftermath of its strike on Israel, the IRGC – i.e. the Commander-in-Chief IRGC, General Hossein Salami – said, ‘We’ve decided to create a new equation (with Israel). From now on, if Israel attacks Iranian interests, figures, and citizens anywhere, we will retaliate from Iran.’
A bit ‘bitchy’ Salami didn’t announce that before Israel killed Zahedi, isn’t it?
Really unfair. But hey: Amir-Abdollahian did announce the doctrine valid at that point in time. So, and, actually, it’s tragic to say this, but: it’s not really the IRGC to blame that nobody in Israel (nor anywhere in the West) listened.
Moreover, nobody said doctrines can’t be adapted as necessary. Even ‘in a matter of minutes’. Nor that they must be declared to the enemy in advance. One way or the other: here you have the latest version of the IRGC’s doctrine for the case of an Israeli attack.
And its new version is perfectly confirmed by all the possible statements from Tehran of the last 48 hours or so – all of them issued quite LOUDLY. The essence of which is:
‘You’ve whacked us, we’ve whacked you, we’re happy and now let’s get sane and stop here.’
Of course, in the political soap opera, the Israelis are ‘humiliated’ and ‘angry’ and ‘promising to hit back’ and calling for UNSC meeting (where Israel, although created by the UN, is the country completely, yet happily ignoring each and every of the UN decisions). Israel’s Minister of Defence Galant was quoted for saying that ‘Israel has no choice but to retaliate’ and that ‘Israel won’t accept an equation in which Iran responds with a direct attack every time Israel strikes targets in Syria… we can’t allow ballistic missiles to be launched against Israel without response’….and the Israelis ‘have already bombed a ‘weapons manufacturing site’ in Lebanon….and that all so much so, even – usually: restrained – German ‘military experts’ are explaining with a smile on their face in TV news that, ‘Israel must retaliate’ – while obviously being happy to ignore all the messages from Tehran….
With other words: we have the Israeli doctrine, and the Western doctrine, too. Essence of the Israeli is: ‘we can do whatever we want to do, and we’re not going to let anybody else even retaliate to what we do’. And the essence of the Westren doctrine is: ‘Israel can do whatever it likes, we’re good at looking some other way, but Iran shouldn’t dare…’ ….with annex something like, ‘oh, and then we’re very much surprised when that results in a fuck up…’
Point is: it’s rarely that doctrines, capabilities and intentions are all this well-known - for an ongoing conflict. Cannot but conclude that I’m feeling really comfortable in this regards.
…at least unless somebody comes to idiotic ideas and starts targeting facilities with prefix ‘nuclear’…
***
Now to ‘facts & figures’ about the IRGC’s attack on Israel…
1.) While many Arabs, critiics of Israel and critics of the West are celebrating and hopeful, one should keep in mind: the IRGC did not strike Israel because of what is Israel doing in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, but because Israel attacked IRGC’s generals in Syria.
With other words: this strike stood in absolutely no connection to the Israeli massacres of 32,000 Palestinian civilians, including 13,000+ Palestinian children.
2.) IRGC’s targets were military bases, no civilians. Known targets included:
Nevatim AB, home-base of the following IASF units:
No. 103 Squadron (C-130s transport)
No. 116 Squadron (F-35I stealth fighters)
No. 117 Squadron (F-35I stealth fighters)
No. 120 Squadron (Boeing 707 tankers)
No. 122 Squadron (GV Shavit & G.550 Eitam/Oron AEW & ELINT/SIGINT aircraft)
No. 131 Squadron (C-130 transports)
No. 140 Squadron (F-35I stealth fighters)
Wing of Zion (VIP-transports)
Unit 5700 (UAVs)
Ramon AB, home-base of the following IASF units:
- No. 113 Squadron (AH-64 attack helicopters)
- No. 119 Squadron (F-16I fighter-bombers)
- No. 190 Squadron (AH-64 attack helicopters)
- No. 201 Squadron (F-16I fighter-bombers)
- No. 253 Squadron (F-16I fighter-bombers)
3.) Considering Nevatim is (directly) north-, and Ramon (‘few kilometres’) south-west of the Israeli nuclear complex in Dimona, it is obvious the IRGC could have, but did not attack that complex.
***
The 1st Wave of the IRGC’s strike consisted of UAVs only. According to Tehran, the IRGC deployed 238 UAVs for this attack. Apparently, all were launched from within Iran. Israel (Admiral Hagari, IDF Spokesman) said that 185 were intercepted and shot down. Different other talking-heads say that the mass of other failed, crashed, or whatever. With other words: it is possible that up to 58 of IRGC’s UAVs ‘went missing’ on their long way from Iran to Israel.
One of funny things in this regards is that Israel (Hagari) explained the story like it was the IASF that shot down all of them, and then went on to stress that, ‘not one entered Israeli airspace’. So, it was Israel that shot them all down, but not over Israel?
Hm, considering many of UAVs and cruise missiles visible on different of IDF-released videos were destroyed after being captured on videos from behind… either Hagari lies and a lot of them have entered the Israeli airspace, or Jordanians lie, and they have left the IASF operate inside the Jordanian airspace, or the Israelis are using videos captured by US, British… even Jordanian fighter jets and UAVs?
Now, from cross-checking US and British releases, it turns out up to around 30% of the IRGC’s UAVs were shot down by
Doesn’t matter?
I think it does. The US armed forces have provided the mass of early warning information. Thanks to US bases in Iraq and Syria, the US armed forces were also the first to engage the UAVs, well before these have reached even Jordan. Finally, withoutthe US, British, and Jordanian involvement, at least some 30-40% of IRGC-launched UAVs would’ve reached Israel unopposed. Indeed, the IASF would have to 180-238 incoming UAVs over its own turf, at most ‘minutes’ short of them reaching their targets.
(…and, for those who might ask: reports [traced back to The Jerusalem Post’s reports] about somebody within the Saudi royal family ‘confirming’ that the Saudis were involved in defending Israel, whether directly or ‘through sharing intel’, turned out to be fake news.)
***
According to official Israel, the 2nd Wave of the IRGC’s strike consisted of 36 cruise missiles only. Haven’t found any other specific statements regarding how many were fired, of what type, or exactly who shot down how many of them. Certainly enough, some were shot down by IASF interceptors, but it’s on hand that many of these were shot down the US, British and Jordanians well before reaching Israel, too. With other words: what’s valid for UAVs is valid for Iranian cruise missiles: without help from the USA, UK, and Jordan, the mass of these would have reached Israel unopposed.
***
It’s the 3rd Wave of this IRGC strike on Israel that’s the most controversial - not only because it seems to have consisted of three sub-waves of ballistic missiles, but especially because of its results.
According to IDF, it included 110 ballistic missiles. The IDF claims to have shot down 103 of these. AFAIK, the IRGC actually said they have fired 120 ballistic missiles: OK, there’s no dispute that several have failed on launch, and few others crashed while underway to Israel. But, if it was as many as 10…? No idea.
Point is: it was only this attack during which Israeli air defences bore the brunt of intercepting incoming missiles. For example, this Arrow II or III shot down one very high above Jordan. However, even then, at least four were shot down by warships of the USN (USS Arleigh Burke/DDG-51 and USS Carney/DDG-64), using RIM-161 SM-3 anti-ballistic missiles. Another was shot down by a MIM-104 Patriot of the US Army over Erbil, in northern Iraq:
***
What kind of missiles has the IRGC deployed?
- Qadr (was the oldest and heaviest type; its latest variants have MIRVs);
- Emad;
- Dezful; and
- Khaybar-Shekan.
***
‘Results’?
Reports about results of this wave are contradictory. A contact in the USA with contacts within the IDF said that Nevatim AB alone was hit ’15 times’. The US media eventually came up with an explanation that Nevatim was hit ‘by 5 missiles’. This is what the IDF seems to be happy with explaining, too, followed by ‘ah, it’s nothing, we’re back to business as usual’. Later on, it ‘released additional footage of the damage’, which is still, at least in Israeli statements, ‘minor’.
As expected, when it comes to attacks on targets in Israel, the ‘OSINT community’ is delivering nothing. Or next to nothing. AFAIK, all the ‘satellite intelligence’ published by now is – rather low-resolution – satellite photos of Nevatim. These are indicative of one hit each on the major runways of the northern complex, with another on a runway near the C-130-area in the southern complex. Arguably, ‘just one’ Israeli C-130 transport was damaged, and then an old aircraft stored already since 2018.
Curiously: very few are paying attention at the fact that, considering the range over which the missiles were fired and that these have still scored at least three hits in the middle of the runways: the precision was, actually, high.
Moreover, videos like this one are showing a large number of Israeli SAMs being fired at a large number of IRGC’s ballistic missiles and their MIRVs and decoys, and intercepting ‘most’ of them, but also at least four ‘hits’. And that’s just one video: a combination of different videos is enabling the conclusion that Nevatim AB alone was hit by some 7 missiles (and/or MIRVs and/or big pieces of wreckage) in a matter of something like 11 seconds.
While, gauging by initial reporting, Ramon AB was actually targeted heavier than Nevatim AB. However, there are no Israeli (or any other kind of ‘Western’) reports about damage caused to Ramon AB (indeed, even that US contact who could say something about Nevatim knows nothing about Ramon).
With other words: actually, we’re far from being shown everything. On the contrary:
Another problem is that – as Ukrainians know all too well, meanwhile – even if one shots down a ballistic missile, this is moving at such a speed that ‘large pieces of its wreckage’ are, regularly, causing lots of damage.
But, of course, anything that was ‘not recorded on video = never happened’.
***
A ‘note for records’: of particular interest is that – at least along what Israel and the West have permitted to be shown so far – the IRGC seems not to have targeted any of numerous ‘sun shelters’ for IASF aircraft, or aprons with (big, ‘soft’ and thus easy to target) transport aircraft, like these at Nevatim AB:
Nor any of (massive) ‘underground’ hardened aircraft shelters, like these at Ramon AB:
Why?
No idea. Perhaps they did: I just do not know if they did, because there are no reports that they did.
***
Bottom line: Yes, the few of IRGC’s missiles – and their MIRVs, and their wreckage – that did get through, have caused minimal known damage. Still, the Israeli claim for interception of ‘99% of incoming (UAVs and) missiles outside Israeli airspace’ is the, meanwhile usual, hogwash. At least it is so that, IF such a rate of intercepts was achieved, then not by the Israelis, but only thanks to the US, British, and Jordanian help. Combined with Iranian public announcements of this attack, plus the US control of the Iraqi airspace, this provided ample warning for the IASF and allies to get ready and into position to defend.
With other words: this was a strike on ‘military’ targets, but one run for propaganda and ‘messaging’ purposes. It delivered the message that the IRGC ‘can’. Indeed, considering IRGC can’t care less about such issues like ‘costs’, and reports that Israel and allies have spent ammunition worth more than US$1 billion, while Iran can ‘print’ missiles like deployed in this attack because they’re cheap to make, it also delivered the message that Iran can continue in this style - and that for ‘quite long’.
Why is this important?
Mind that this is about the Middle East. And what matters in the Middle East the most is: perception. Which is why the IRGC named this operation ‘True Promise’, and the IDF its (and allied) operations ‘Iron Shield’, too. See: ‘IRGC delivers what it promises’, and ‘IDF has an iron shield, nothing gets through it’.
Well, my perception is that the IRGC has hit Israel exactly the way it said it would (if attacked); that it did so transparently; that it did hit, too, and that it said, ‘I’m happy with this, now behave’.
But also: my impression is that the IRGC could’ve hit much harder, and then without any kind of warning or public announcements days and hours in advance. But, that’s a ‘what if’, so no point in discussing it: at most, one might want to keep it in mind for, perhaps, sometimes in the future.
For once, the administration of the US president Biden seems to have understood and acknowledged the IRGC’s message. We’re going to see if Israel might have comprehended it, too.
The content is published with the permission of the author. First published here.
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