Crimea: Decisive Target of the Russian-Ukrainian War

The importance of Crimea for Russia and Ukraine is not only symbolic. The national security and economic development of Ukraine depend on its liberation.

Crimean port Sevastopol (Aqyar) allows the Russian Black Sea fleet to control the coastline and ports of Ukraine.  Crimea is also a natural gate for the Azov Sea. Moreover, it became a logistic hub for Russian military activity and a post for the Russian air force to strike both the Black Sea and Ukraine. Ukraine, even before the Russian invasion, was aware of the necessity of taking back Crimea and always emphasized that its ultimate aim was to free the unlawfully annexed regions in 2014, especially the Crimean Peninsula.

Ukraine’s counter offensive shows signs of gaining momentum by breaking the first of the three lines of the Surovikin defensive constructions. Through the breach on the Zaporizhia, Ukraine aims to take the strategic city of Tokmak. If Ukraine can take back the city then it can control a key railway that connects Crimea to eastern Donetsk. Moreover, thanks to its  long range artillery and missile systems, it can control the motorway (M14), which connects Odessa to the Russian border east of Mariupol, from a distance. However, the city has been turned into a fortress by the Russians. To overcome the city's defenses, Ukraine needs to move its heavy weapons to range. But he has two more lines of defense to overcome. The fact that the last two lines are less developed than the first one gives hope for this to be achieved before winter comes.

There are two other progresses on the Russian defenses in Novosyolka and in Vasylivka but they can’t be considered as breaches yet. Overall the assault in the South of Ukraine aims to first isolate Crimea by cutting the land bridge and then make it untenable by the Russian military.

Even though the Donetsk connection is cut, the 19- km Kerch Bridge connects Crimea with Russia through motorway and railway. Ukraine previously successfully damaged the bridge thrice – first in Oct 2022, then in July and August 2023 – disturbing the transportation. President Zelensky in his last visit to the USA, was promised to acquire the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). If Ukraine acquires this system not only with cluster bombs but also with single warheads then they could easily and effectively damage the bridge.

Meanwhile Ukraine, according to its plan, intensified the attacks towards the peninsula with the aim to make it untenable by the enemy. On August 23 a radar station and an air defense system were destroyed, on September 13 a dry dock and two ships were damaged, a day later two air defense systems were hit. On September 22, Ukraine destroyed the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea fleet, killing 105 personnel, including 33 officers. The leadership gap resulting from the loss of officers is expected to weaken the Black Sea fleet.

Ukraine's counter-offensive involved not only military action, but also diplomacy. Indeed, initially the West had many red lines on their military aid to Ukraine, including their reluctance to supply armored fighting vehicles (IFVs), tanks, ATACMs and jet fighters. The self-imposed red lines imposed by the West were not limited to armaments, but also on the areas where Ukraine could conduct operations.

The Ukrainian counter attack involves not only military action but also diplomacy. Indeed in the beginning the West had many red lines regarding military aid to Ukraine including armored fighting vehicles (IFVs), tanks, ATACMS and jet fighters. Self imposed red lines of the West were not restricted only to the armament but also to the territory that can be attacked by Ukraine. Indeed at the beginning of the conflict Western leaders who were trying to secure a cease-fire often were hinting that annexed territories of Crimea and the Donbass region might have to be accepted as lost.

Ukraine crossed these red lines by accustoming the West to the realities of the ongoing war with Russia. Their success on the battlefield at first allowed the West to gain confidence in its military prowess. The violation of the Russian border by the Russian paramilitary groups on the side of Ukraine and the long-range attacks on Belgorod showed that Russian territory is not inviolable. This is followed by Ukraine’s attack on Moscow with improvised drones. All these showed that even without the involvement of the West Ukraine is able to attack Russian soil and Russia is not inclined to retaliate or escalate the war as easily as they pretend to.

While these successes overcome the Western aversion for allowing military equipment capable of attack beyond Russian borders, diplomatic activities like appointing a foreign minister of Tatar origin and through organization of summits like Crimea Platform emphasized the necessity of taking back Crimea.

The current concern of the West is what would happen if Russia fell into anarchy after a Ukrainian victory and the fate of the Russian nuclear weaponry in the case of such a collapse. Similar concerns had been raised during the collapse of the Soviet Union but new states could be established in the region without a wide range of anarchy. However, past red lines prevented the West from supporting the Republic of Ichkeria. The Chechen-Russian war was a rehearsal for the conflict in Ukraine on a smaller scale.

The main obstacle of Ukraine in retaking the occupied and annexed territories is these concerns and the West' s war fatigue. Ukraine must once again convince the West that victory is safe and possible if the right weapons are supplied.