Şükrü Okan: what answer should (not) be expected from Türkiye?

On August 13, the "Russian warship" had every chance to hear the already known instruction regarding the direction it should follow - this time from the crew of the Turkish cargo ship Şükrü Okan, which was sailing under the flag of Palau in the international waters of the Black Sea. However, this did not happen. Let's figure out whether we should expect a reaction from Ankara to the Russian provocation.

First of all, it should be noted that many details related to the incident surrounding the Şükrü Okan still remain unknown or not officially confirmed. For example, according to the Russian side, at the time of the forced stop and inspection by the Russian special operations forces, the Turkish cargo was in the southwestern part of the Black Sea. This version was generally confirmed to CNN by a representative of the Turkish ship owner. He said the Turkish crew received a message from a Russian warship while in international waters and then tried to return to Turkish territorial waters and contact the coast guard or other officials.

At the same time, the Ukrainian resource InformNapalm, citing sources from the tanker Olvia, which was nearby at the time, claims that the inspection took place in the territorial waters of Türkiye. Any obstruction to freedom of navigation and illegal inspection of ships in international waters is in itself a gross violation of international maritime law. If this version is confirmed, the forced inspection of a ship by the Russians in the territorial waters of a NATO member country is already leading to an international scandal.

Against the background of stunning silence from Ankara, the Russian Ministry of Defense every day continues to share more and more humiliating details of the search of the Turkish vessel and the rather harsh, as for a strategic partner, treatment of the Turkish crew.

So far, the most drastic reaction to the incident was the sign of "gray wolves" - a symbol of Turkish nationalism, which one of the Turkish sailors showed on camera to the Russians while kneeling on the deck of his own ship.

Official Ankara has so far refrained from commenting, limiting itself to the assurance that "the incident is under investigation."

It is significant that there is also silence in the Turkish mass media, which surprises not only Ukrainian but also many Turkish experts. It is hard to imagine such restraint, whether in the place of a Russian warship, an American, or a NATO destroyer.

However, reading Turkish newspapers and social networks, it is easy to believe that Şükrü Okan belongs to the mysterious country of Palau (the country of its registration), and Türkiye has nothing to do with it, except for the name of the Turkish admiral, whose name the ship bears. Therefore, ordinary Turks generally wonder why Türkiye should protect the interests of the country, the existence of which they only now accidentally learned.

The formation of public opinion is complemented by a series of "exclusive interviews with experts", which explain that after withdrawing from the grain initiative, Russia warned about the possibility of inspecting all ships bound for Ukrainian ports for weapons. Therefore, it was worth waiting for.

At the same time, leading national media are abuzz with headlines about Türkiye's redoubled diplomatic efforts to restore the grain deal, its indispensability for ensuring world food security, and the unique mediating role Ankara plays between Moscow and Kyiv.

The absence of any mention of Russia's violation of international maritime law, in particular, freedom of commercial navigation, compliance with the Montreux Convention - the "sacred cow" of Turkish regional policy, or the role of NATO and Türkiye itself in preventing the Black Sea from turning into a "Russian lake" hints that the preservation informational silence is not accidental.

And it is worth understanding why.

First, Ankara is interested in preserving the "grain agreement", which brings it significant diplomatic, geopolitical, and - last but not least - economic dividends. Therefore, most likely, calls to all parties to return to the negotiating table in order to preserve this format will sound louder than condemnation of Russia's illegal actions.

Second, time is of the essence. Putin's visit to Türkiye is expected in the second half of August, which is highly anticipated in Ankara. Rumor has it that the Turkish president is much more eager to meet face-to-face with the Russian dictator than the other way around. Any sharp statements by Ankara ahead of the planned meeting could give the Kremlin a convenient excuse to cancel the visit, citing Ankara's "unfriendly moves."

Thirdly, it is important to understand the broader context of bilateral relations. Despite the efforts of Turkish diplomacy (and financial circles) to revive cooperation with the West, Russia maintains its "special status". While Türkiye struggles with a deep economic crisis, Russia remains the No. 1 supplier of tourists, as well as a source of energy and capital. Last year alone, Russians founded more than 1,300 companies in Türkiye, which is 670% more than in 2021. Türkiye's dependence on the supply of Russian hydrocarbons and the timeliness of payments for them remains. According to official data in 2022, Ankara purchased up to 45% of its gas, 40% of its coal, and 20% of oil for its needs from Russia. After the introduction of sanctions, which Türkiye did not join, Turkish imports of Russian oil increased sharply. During this period, trade between the countries more than doubled, approaching a record 70 billion dollars. Russia confidently holds the leadership in the structure of Turkish imports and is the seventh-largest export partner.

Fourth, on the eve of local elections in 2024, one of the key issues for the Turkish authorities remains the return of millions of Syrian refugees to Syria. Now the possibility of creating conditions for their resettlement to Aleppo is being worked out. Not only the stability of the "safe zones" along the Syrian-Turkish border but also the general normalization of Ankara's relations with the Assad regime largely depends on Moscow's position. Although Russia's military capabilities are significantly limited due to the war in Ukraine, they are still sufficient for border provocations and the creation of another migration crisis, which may be the last straw in the overflowing cup of patience of the Turkish voter.

And now it is perceived as a much greater threat to the national security of Türkiye (and the current government) than the performance of the "Pirates of the Black Sea", poorly played by the Russians on board the Şükru Okan.

In addition, Turkish experts tend to consider this incident as a "warning to Ankara" because of its cooperation with Ukraine. The first such signal, in their opinion, was the Russian missile attack on the Motor Sich enterprise, which, among other things, manufactures engines for Turkish drones. So, at the moment, the Kremlin's provocative moves are perceived more as manifestations of dissatisfaction with the Ukrainian-Turkish rapprochement and Putin's helplessness, than as a real threat to Türkiye or its Navy in the Black Sea.

Of course, among Turkish experts, there are also those who advocate for a decisive, or at least symmetrical, response to Russia. For example, the Turkish Institute for the Study of Russia recalls that since 2015, Russian ships have been transporting a lot of weapons, including tanks, to Syria for the Assad regime. And although it was forbidden, they were not checked when passing through the Straits. Therefore, Türkiye now has every right to stop for inspections of Russian ships that are heading through the Bosphorus to the entrance to the Black Sea and to the exit to the Mediterranean. If we add to this Ukraine's official appeals to Ankara with a legitimate request to check Russian supposedly "civilian" ships carrying weapons to Ukraine for weapons, such checks would seem like a completely logical step.

Another way to send a clear message to Moscow without direct confrontation could be to complicate the permit procedures for Russian oil tankers that regularly cross the Bosphorus. Considering the average age of the Russian "shadow fleet", this should not be a particular problem if there is political will.

The director of the aforementioned institute, Salih Yilmaz, known for his traditional loyalty to Moscow, hints at the possibility of radical steps to Russia: "Russian gas may not reach Türkiye. By ending its participation in the grain initiative and shelling Ukrainian ports, Russia also gave Ukraine the opportunity to attack its commercial ports, especially the port of Novorossiysk. In this situation, Russian oil will not be able to enter the world market from the Black Sea. Russia must either return to the negotiating table for an agreement that allows the export of Ukrainian grain in exchange for oil or be prepared to cut off trade in the Black Sea with the possibility of destroying its navy." He also reminds us that if the war in Ukraine continues, the next threat may be the destruction or damage of the Turkish or Blue Stream, as happened earlier with Nord Stream-2. Therefore, he advises Ankara to implement the project of supplying Libyan gas to Türkiye in partnership with the UAE and Qatar as soon as possible.

It is clear that there is a wide range of mirror or asymmetric steps in response to Russian provocations: from providing Turkish Navy escort for commercial vessels in the Black Sea to inspections or delays of Russian ships passing through the Bosphorus.

However, the most likely reaction of Ankara at the moment will be its absence.

"Türkiye will never leave the humiliation it suffered from Russia unanswered. But the answer will be the same as always - calm, clear, decisive. And not necessarily fast," one of the Turkish diplomats commented unofficially on the incident. - "Remember how the Turkish diplomatic delegation was waiting for Putin in Russia for some time? And a few years later, Putin was already waiting himself..."

This opinion coincides with the assessment of a well-known Turkish security expert: "The fact that the Russians feel free at a distance of 50 nautical miles from the Bosphorus is truly scandalous. On the other hand, the Russian operation was so ridiculous, senseless, and poorly executed that it hardly scared anyone." So, in his opinion, the reason for Ankara's silence is not Russia's fears or desire to please it, but its own interests. "Erdoğan will not react until he is 100% sure that the Russians will not return to the grain agreement. When he is convinced that there is no chance to save the agreement, completely different options will open up."