Russia promotes a story about the Azov defenders' "surrender": how the enemy's information and psychological operation works

The most commonplace television is a terrifying and effective modern weapon on par with airplanes, tanks, guns, and nuclear bombs.

Today, we are fighting the Russian neo-empire not only in physical space, but also in information space. In some places, their ferocity and endurance rival the fiercest battles on the front lines, and the consequences frequently determine the winner - the one behind the battlefield.

The Russian Federation's special information operations against Ukraine have increased dramatically since February. They aren't always obvious, and they aren't always effective, because Ukrainians have learned to counter the enemy on this stretch of the front. 

Our enemy is actively exploiting the information space to undermine the Ukrainian defense.

Since February, the Russian propaganda machine has steadily increased the intensity of anti-Ukrainian actions in the information space, expanding the topic of information aggression and increasing pressure on our society with the goal of "frightening" the enemy. 

Every day, two or three propaganda products are thrown into our information field, according to my observations. Furthermore, the Russians support approximately two dozen short-term information projects as well as up to five key long-term projects.

Among the most recent topics that have already become the focus of serious Russian propaganda efforts is the story of Mariupol's defense, particularly the actions of Azov defenders. 

It is now clear that Russia has decided to use this story for a long-term IPSO (information and psychological operation. - ed.). 

We can now speak confidently about this because Russia has already "lit up" its key players. 

Let me remind you of some facts.

 First, it is the statement of Russian Federation State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin about the introduction of a bill to Duma deputies that will make it impossible to exchange Azov defenders.

The second is quite consistent with the previous statement of the Russian Federation's Supreme Court on the case of recognizing the Azov battalion as a terrorist organization.

The third is the report that the investigative committee has opened criminal proceedings against Mariupol's defenders for "crimes against humanity." 

All three episodes and their participants are part of a well-executed special operation formula. Furthermore, the VIP status of individuals and organizations involved in this informational and psychological operation speaks volumes about the Kremlin's special attention paid to it.

Furthermore, the so-called DPR leadership's statements about the possibility of establishing an "international tribunal" to "investigate" the "crimes" of Mariupol defenders should be considered, as they were allegedly committed directly on the DPR territory. 

Regarding the operation's target audiences. First and foremost, it is Ukrainian society. Then there's our military and political leaders, as well as the Azov Regiment's personnel. That is, the thesis will be "thrown in" that "Azov" was, in fact, given to the enemy, and no prisoners of war will be exchanged.

If no exchange occurs, there is an act of capitulation and the capture of Ukrainian soldiers. These are already being heard in our information environment. When I look at the TV narratives, it is clear that they are intended to shake up the situation in the country. And, because this topic carries such a strong emotional charge, it will be the most dangerous tool in the enemy's arsenal for the next year and a half. 

Of course, the Russian Federation's special propaganda will use it for domestic consumption, brainwashing the residents of the "LPR / DPR," and will also try to promote it in the West through its agents of influence.

The question is, how do we counteract this special operation? 

We must confront the aggressor's lies with the truth. We must be prepared to effectively refute the most absurd Russian accusations, as well as to respond quickly to absurd statements made by local authorities. We need to prepare for a marathon on this subject. 

It is already possible to forecast the peak times of its information activity. For example, this will be the start of the so-called court, then some stages of the investigation, followed by a "court verdict," and then a decision by the Russian president on pardon or a possible exchange of Azov fighters.

This information topic's potential will allow it to be number one in the top events for at least a year. We must actively oppose this special operation right now, clearly defend Ukraine's and international military law positions, and prepare for future information battles. 

So, if we remain vigilant and professional, we will win! 

Dmytro Snegiryov