Turkish elections-2023: what to expect for Ukraine? Part 4

This time we will dwell in more detail on what opposition representatives think about Ukraine, cooperation with Russia, and Türkiye's Euro-Atlantic choice.

In previous articles, we have already written about the general mood in Türkiye on the eve of the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections, the ruling coalition's position on issues important to Ukraine, and the formation of new pre-election blocs. 

Let's start with the main thing.

Whoever comes to power in Türkiye next year, we should not expect drastic changes in the country's foreign policy.

The policy of balancing between Russia and Ukraine is considered by all political forces as the one that is most in line with Türkiye's national interests, and therefore, most likely, will remain the cornerstone of Ankara's regional strategy.

Several factors can explain such constancy in the foreign policy views of Turkish elites.

First, maintaining good relations with Russia in its various reincarnations - from the Russian Empire and the USSR to the modern form of neo-colonialism in the form of a "federation" - is considered a guarantee of Türkiye's national security and stability in the region. Even though the myth of "great and invincible" Russia has been successfully destroyed in front of the eyes of the whole world thanks to the courage of the Ukrainian people, the historical traumas of Turkish society (devastating defeats in most of the Russo-Ottoman wars and the First World War, as well as the constant Soviet threat during the “cold” war) forced the country for centuries to form its foreign policy with an eye on Moscow and build relations with other countries taking into account its "legitimate" interests in the region.

Likewise, Turks still remember with gratitude the second president of the Republic and associate of Atatürk, Ismet İnönü, whose policy of neutrality in the 1940s allowed Türkiye to go through the entire Second World War without losses. This desire to avoid an unequivocal choice of one of the warring parties to protect oneself from the threat of confrontation with the other side of the conflict runs through the entire history of the Republic of Türkiye.

Therefore, the rhetoric of the current leadership of the country and calls not to ignore Russia's position are to a large extent a reflection of this centuries-old tradition of balancing - and, therefore, it is unlikely to change significantly with the coming to power of a new team.

Secondly, public sentiment also demands that Türkiye observes "neutrality" in the Russian-Ukrainian war (52%) and plays the role of an "impartial mediator" (50,7%). Such views are inherent not only to the supporters of the ruling party, which from the very beginning of the Russian invasion took a position of "pro-Ukrainian neutrality", providing Kyiv with political and military-technical support, but keeping the channels for communication and cooperation with Moscow open, and the majority of Turkish citizens, regardless of their political views.

The reasons for this "special" attitude towards Russia among sympathizers of different parties can be different: pragmatic interests, which, according to the majority of Turkish citizens, require the development of trade and close economic ties with Russia; the dependence of the Turkish budget on Russian money, business investments and tourists, which has deepened against the background of the current financial crisis; anti-American sentiments or admiration for communist ideology.

In any case, all political forces seeking the support of the electorate in the elections and counting on the political future in Türkiye should take into account similar public sentiments.

For example, for many supporters of the Kemalist center-left Republican People's Party (CHP), which is currently the main opposition force, Russia remains the direct heir of the Soviet Union, with its "bright socialist past", "great culture of Chekhov and Dostoevsky" and romanticized perception of the Russian intelligentsia beginning of the 20th century. The fact that only Lenin's monuments are left of socialism in Russia, and the children of modern Russian politicians and oligarchs do not shy away from living and studying in the countries of the capitalist West, usually does not bother Turkish fighters for the rights of the working class.

In addition, among some opposition forces, anti-American sentiments are no less widespread than in pro-government nationalist and conservative circles.

For example, Muharrem Ince, who was the deputy head of the CHP faction in the parliament for a long time and was the only opposition candidate in the 2018 presidential elections, recently stated: "We are against Erdoğan's policies in the areas of the economy, education, agriculture, and refugees. But the current policy of neutrality in the Ukrainian-Russian war corresponds to the interests of our country... We are neither pro-America nor pro-Russia. To unequivocally support Ukraine in this conflict would mean that we support America. That we support American bases in Greece. That we support the [Kurdish terrorist organizations] PKK/YPG in the south of our country. I think it's very dangerous."

Although at present Mr. Ince no longer represents the CHP, and from 2021 he heads the newly created Party of the Motherland (Memleket Partisi), this logic is typical of many oppositionists of various political spectrums.

Interestingly, these words were addressed by the former top bureaucrat of the Republican People's Party, Muharrem Ince, to its current leader, Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu, who, during a recent visit to the United States, criticized Erdoğan's balancing policy, saying that "in the Russo-Turkish war, Türkiye should have become on the side of Ukraine". Although such statements reflect the conjuncture of the moment rather than the strategic vision of the opposition, they have sparked a flurry of criticism on Turkish social media for "drawing the country into someone else's war" and "indulging US interests." The very fact that Kılıçdaroğlu started a series of foreign visits on the eve of the elections from Washington made him an easy target for accusations of "serving the interests of the West" and working for American special services. If we add to this the Alevi origin of the opposition leader and his secular and much more liberal views on the "scraps" of conservative Muslim society, it is not difficult to imagine that any statements in support of Türkiye's pro-Western (or pro-Ukrainian) course through propaganda efforts quickly turn him into an "agent of the West".

In addition to the CHP, the opposition "bloc of six" includes five more political parties of different orientations, which currently do not have one candidate, but also their united program. Opposition leaders, who represent a wide spectrum of views from former foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in Erdoğan's government to Atatürk's political descendants, avoid public discussions of foreign policy as potentially "dangerous" topics that could lead to a split within the bloc.

At the same time, the representatives of the opposition are united in calling for the resumption of a stable dialogue with the USA and European countries and the rejection of hostile rhetoric towards the West. The percentage of Turks who seek Türkiye's EU integration and normalization of relations with NATO partners is also traditionally higher among CHP supporters and their allies than among the electorate of the ruling Justice and Development Party.

In addition, experts note that if the opposition wins the elections and a possible return to the parliamentary system of government, the country's foreign policy will once again be in the hands of career diplomats and bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while now the critical role in shaping the country's foreign policy course is played by the presidential administration and a limited circle of advisers close to the president and political appointees in high government positions.

The role of the military and the Ministry of Defense as important actors in the field of foreign policy will also decrease. In contrast to the policy of military involvement and cross-border operations, where the fulfillment of the goals of Turkish diplomacy depends on the success of the actions of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, the course of "reconciliation" declared by the opposition promises a return to more moderate traditional diplomacy, which should reduce the potential for conflict in Ankara's relations with NATO partners.

At the same time, the so-called "hellaleşme" policy (forgiveness of grievances and reconciliation with everyone), as Turkish experts often call the foreign policy program of the opposition, does not promise easy times for Ukraine. Although the leadership of the CHP unequivocally condemned the holding of pseudo-referendums in the occupied territories of Ukraine and does not recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea, talks about the need to find a mutually acceptable compromise with Russia, saving Putin's face and peace negotiations with Moscow are periodically heard in the party corridors of the CHP.

In particular, Kiliçdaroğlu’s chief diplomatic adviser, Ambassador Yunal Çevikoz, who is predicted by analysts to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new government, called on the authorities to look at the conflict in Ukraine through the eyes of Russia, which "sees it not as a bilateral crisis between Ukraine and Russia, but as a crisis between Ukraine and Donbas". With the beginning of the invasion, the official rhetoric changed, but the desire to find a formula according to which "Ukraine would win, but Russia would not lose" persists not only in the authorities but also in the opposition.

Meral Akşener's "Good" party remains the most consistent in condemning Russian aggression in the region. Having united secular nationalists based on a strong state and moderate ideas of Turkish/Turkic nationalism, it traditionally takes the most principled position regarding the need to protect the rights of Turkic communities - Uyghurs in China, Chechens and Circassians in Russia, Meskhetian Turks and Crimean Tatars in Ukraine. In addition, understanding the threat of increasing dependence of the Turkish government on the Kremlin, Akşener consistently advocates a review of relations with the aggressor country on a more equal basis, demands the nationalization of the Akkuyu NPP, which has every chance of turning into a Russian naval base on the Mediterranean coast of Türkiye and does not hesitate to call a spade a spade in condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Understanding that a strong sovereign Ukraine and a weakened Russia are the keys to Türkiye’s "return" to the Caucasus and Central Asia, makes Turkish nationalists natural partners of Kyiv.

Whether historical traumas, systemic limitations, economic interests, and internal party struggles will allow us to move away from traditional balancing in favor of undisputed support for Ukraine in case the opposition wins the elections, is still an open question.